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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On March 3, 2007, officers obtained a search warrant to search 6501 Poplar in
Boise, Idaho, following the death of an infant child in the basement apartment of the
residence.

Michael Reynolds rented a bedroom in this residence and shared the

common areas with the other residents. Although the warrant mentioned in passing the
smell of growing marijuana coming from a locked bedroom upstairs, much of the
warrant dealt with the investigation of the infant's death. During the search of the entire
residence, marijuana plants were found in Mr. Reynolds' locked room.

In his

Appellant's Brief, Mr. Reynolds argued that the search of his bedroom apartment
violated his Fourth Amendment and Idaho Constitutional rights to be free from unlawful
searches and seizures, because the search warrant failed to specifically authorize the
search of his bedroom apartment, and the evidence seized from this search should be
suppressed. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.)
In response, the State argues that the search warrant in question satisfied the
particularity requirement of the United States and Idaho Constitutions, was not
overbroad, and that even if the search warrant was defective, the search of
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom apartment was still reasonable because "Detective Stiles" did
not know, nor should he reasonably have known of, the multi-unit nature of the
residence. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address these
arguments raised by the State.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Reynolds' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Reynolds' motion to suppress because the
warrant lacked particularity regarding the search of Mr. Reynolds' apartment?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Reynolds' Motion To Suppress Because
The Warrant Lacked Particularity Regarding The Search Of Mr. Reynolds' Apartment

A.

Introduction
Mr. Reynolds contends the search of his bedroom apartment violated his Fourth

Amendment and Idaho Constitutional rights to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures because the search warrant failed to specifically authorize the search of his
bedroom apartment. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) 1 In response, the State argues that
the search warrant in question, (1) satisfied the particularity requirement of the United
States' and Idaho Constitutions, (2) was not overbroad, and (3) that even if the search
warrant was defective, the search of Mr. Reynolds' bedroom apartment was still
reasonable under Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987), because "Detective Stiles
did not know, nor should he reasonably have known, the multi-unit nature of the
residence." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) These three issues are each addressed in turn
below.
B.

The Search Warrant Did Not Satisfy The Particularity Requirement Of The United
State's And Idaho Constitutions
First, the State asserts that the search warrant in question satisfied the

particularity requirement because, although it did not describe "the legal (i.e. rental)

1

In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Reynolds' also addressed the court's finding that the
search was proper and no warrant was required under the "plain smell" doctrine.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-13.) The State has not addressed this argument in response,
noting that the district court had three implied basis for denying Mr. Reynolds' motion to
suppress and that on appeal, the State was presenting two of these reasons and raising
a third, alternative basis, to affirm the district court's ruling. (Respondent's Brief, p.6,
n.1.)
4

arrangement pertaining to [Mr.] Reynolds' bedroom, the search warrant nonetheless
particularly described the physical residence to be searched by providing the correct
street address, which included [Mr.] Reynolds' bedroom." (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.)
To support this argument, the State cites State v. Young, 136 Idaho 711, 715, 39 P.3d
651, 655 (Ct. App. 2002), and focuses on the fact that the description of the home itself
was adequate. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) However, this argument ignores the fact
that multi-unit dwellings have been treated differently than a single family residence and
a general description of the address of the building without identification of the specific
unit is not adequate to satisfy the Fourth Amendment or the Idaho State Constitutional
requirements that a warrant must '"particularly describe the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized."' State v. Teal, 145 Idaho 985,989,188 P.3d 927,931
(2008) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 17); (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.6-9.)
It is well established that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement is "to prevent general searches." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84
(1987). Specifically, "[b]y limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and
things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the
search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of
the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Id. (citing
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,

569-572 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring in result); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 48182, 485 (1965); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96 (1927)).
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State v. Young dealt specifically with a single family residence and the adequacy

of the description of that residence in the warrant. See Young, 136 Idaho at 654-55, 39
P.3d at 714-15. Applying Young to multi-unit residences to argue that only the street
address need to be given without specifying which apartment or describing the unit, is
contradictory to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Maryland v. Garrison, as
well as federal circuit court opinions that have required a description of the unit to be
searched in multi-unit residences. See Garrison, at 85-86. United States v. Busk, 693
F.2d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982).
Therefore, as argued in the Appellant's Brief, the warrant in question failed to meet the
particularity requirement of the United States and Idaho Constitutions because it failed
to specify Mr. Reynolds' bedroom or unit. (See also Appellant's Brief, pp.6-9.)

C.

The Search Warrant Was Overbroad
In Response to Mr. Reynolds' argument on appeal that the warrant was invalid

because it did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, the State also argues that the warrant in
this case was not overbroad because the affidavit provided probable cause to search
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom. 2 (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.) However, the affidavit did not
2

In the Respondent's Brief that State notes that the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to be specific in both particularity of what
is sought and in breath by limiting the scope of the warrant to the probable cause on
which it is based. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11 (quoting United States v. Spilotoro,
800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986).) Although, Mr. Reynolds has argued that the warrant
in question does not meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment
generally, this argument has essentially encompassed both particularity and breadth,
although it has mostly been relevant to the warrant's overbreadth because it failed to
specify which unit was to be searched.
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specify Mr. Reynolds' bedroom specifically, stating only that the Detective "smelled the
odor of growing marijuana in the residence, apparently coming from an upstairs
bedroom that is locked." (R., p.44.) As both Mr. Reynolds' and Detective Stiles testified
at the motion to suppress hearing, there were two bedrooms upstairs, both of which
were locked and both of which were searched during the execution of the search
warrant. (Tr.9/14/07, p.28, L.6 - p.31, L.15; p.53, L.21 - p.52, L.6.) Therefore, even if
the State is correct in asserting that the warrant established probable cause to search
Mr. Reynolds' room, even though the multi-unit nature of the residence was not
disclosed, the warrant is still overbroad and did not provide probable cause to search
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom because it did not specifically identify which of the bedrooms
Detective Stiles smelled marijuana coming from. (R., p.44.) Furthermore, the use of
the word "apparently" in the affidavit also implies that the affiant did not have first hand
knowledge of which bedroom the smell was emanating from. (R., p.44.)
Although Detective Stiles testified at the motion to suppress hearing that
Mr. Reynolds' bedroom had an odor of growing marijuana, as the State notes, "whether
the search warrant in [Mr.] Reynolds' case was overbroad depends on whether the
supporting affidavit provided probable cause to search [Mr.] Reynolds' bedroom."
(Respondent's Brief p.11 (citing Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85).).

Here, the affidavit in

support of the warrant did not provide specific probable cause to search Mr. Reynolds'
bedroom apartment.

See State v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 278,858 P.2d 814, 817

(Ct. App. 1993) ("In order to provide an adequate basis for a determination of probable
cause to issue a search warrant, the assertions in the affidavit must establish a
sufficient nexus between criminal activity, the things to be seized, and the place to be
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searched."); State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 852 P.2d 1387 (reviewing only the
facts presented in the affidavit to determine probable cause when there was no record
of the hearing conducted before issuing the warrant).

Therefore, the fact Detective

Stiles had information related specifically to Mr. Reynolds' room that was not disclosed
in the affidavit for the warrant does not now provide probable cause to search the room.

D.

If The Search Warrant Was Defective In Its' Description Of The Place To Be
Searched. The Search Was Not Reasonable Under Maryland v. Garrison
Finally, the State argues "[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that [sic] was some defect

in the description of the place to be search, and that the search warrant was therefore
overbroad, the search was still reasonable" under Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79
(1987). 3

(Respondent's Brief, p.13.)

However, the State's argument misapplies

Garrison because before upholding the search in Garrison, the Supreme Court upheld

the warrant. Furthermore, as argued in the Appellant's Brief, the officers in this case
knew or should have known of the multi-unit nature of the residence in question. See id.
at 86, 88; (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-11.)
In Garrison the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
warrant executed in error at the defendant's apartment. Id. The defendant resided on
the third floor of an apartment building. Id. at 80. An apartment occupied by Lawrence
McWebb was also on the third floor. Id. at 80. Officers obtained a search warrant for

3

Although it appears the State is simply arguing the warrant and search should have be
upheld under Garrison, to the extent the State is attempting to a make an argument that
the officers were acting on good faith on the warrant if it is invalid, the Idaho Supreme
Court has expressly rejected the good faith exception to the warrant requirement in
Idaho under Idaho's exclusionary rule. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660
(1992).
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the third floor of the apartment building. Id. At the time officers applied for and obtained
the warrant, they believed there to be only one apartment on the third floor. Id.

This

belief was based on investigation by officers who made inquiries at the apartment
building, made a check of gas and electric bills, and researched police records. Id. at
85 n.10.

Pursuant to the officers' investigations, there appeared to be only one

apartment on the third floor of the building. Id.
When officers made entry into the third-floor of the building, they first entered a
common hallway shared by both apartments on the third floor. Id. at 81. After the
officers had begun their search and found heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia in the
defendant's apartment, they realized the third floor contained two apartments:
defendant's and Mr. McWebb's.

Id.

Upon making this discovery, the officers

terminated their search and did not make any further searches of defendant's
apartment. Id.
The defendant was charged with violating the controlled substances act. Id. He
moved to suppress all evidence seized from his apartment, arguing that the search of
his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id. at 80. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and on
appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded
the case for a new trial. The state appealed. Id. at 81-82.
With respect to the validity of the warrant and the officers' initial entry into the
defendant's apartment, the United States Supreme Court concluded as follows:
We have no difficulty concluding that the officers' entry into the third-floor
common area was legal; they carried a warrant for those premises, and
they were accompanied by McWebb, who provided the key that they used
to open the door giving access to the third-floor common area. If the
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officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained
two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor,
and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have
been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's apartment.
Id. at 86 (emphasis added). The Court then went on to analyze the officer's search of

the defendant's apartment finding that the search of the defendant's apartment was
"consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 88. The Court noted
that "the validity of the search of the [defendant's] apartment pursuant to a warrant
authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on whether the officers' failure to
realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable."
Id.

Thus, in upholding the search, the Court first found that the warrant was valid and

then that the search pursuant to that warrant was reasonable.

See id. at 85-88.

Therefore, the State's argument that the search can be upheld under Garrison even if
the warrant is deemed invalid misapplies the holding in Garrison.
Additionally, unlike Garrison, the officers in this case had the same information
regarding the multi-unit character of the residence when they obtained the warrant as
when they executed it; therefore, if the warrant is deemed invalid because they knew or
should have known that Mr. Reynolds' bedroom was a separate unit or apartment, then
the search is also invalid.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.)

Furthermore, as

Mr. Reynolds' previously argued in his Appellant's Brief, and incorporates herein by
reference, the officers knew of should have known that the residence in question was a
multi-unit residence and that the warrant was overbroad, making their search of
Mr. Reynolds' room unreasonable.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.)

Therefore,

Mr. Reynolds contends the district court erred when it denied his motion so suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Reynolds respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
remand this case with the instruction that the evidence seized in the search of his room
be suppressed.
DATED this 2 nd day of June, 2009.
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